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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
SALT LAKE CITY LINES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 8654 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County 
denying the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in the 
above entitled case and granting the defendant's Motion for a 
Summary Judgment of Dismissal. 
The appellant raises no procedural question by this appeal 
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as it is agreed that this was a proper case for summary judg-
ment. All material facts in the case are established by the 
pleadings, the only question being a question of law as to 
whether the plaintiff's Motion or the defendant's Motion should 
have been granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is a Utah corporation rendering mass trans-
portation service in Salt Lake City and surrounding area. On 
the 12th day of July, 1944, the Public Service Commission 
of Utah issued Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 
640 to the plaintiff, granting to the plaintiff the right to 
operate street cars, trolley coaches and motor busses in Salt 
Lake City and the surrounding area. A copy of the certificate 
was attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A and is part of the 
record on appeal in this court. Salt Lake City Lines at the 
time of issuance of the Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 
took over the services that had theretofore been rendered by its 
predecessor, Utah Light & Traction Company. In 1946 Salt 
Lake City Lines ceased the operation of street cars and trolley 
coaches and during the same year removed from the city streets 
of Salt Lake City all tracks and trolleys, and since 1947 has 
operated solely by the use of motor busses. 
On the 25th day of February, 1951, Salt Lake City adopted 
an Ordinance which purported to grant a franchise to Salt Lake 
City Lines to operate as a common carrier within Salt Lake 
City, a copy of this Ordinance is attached to the Complaint 
as Exhibit B. Section 8 of this Ordinance provided that as a 
consideration for the granting of the franchise, Salt Lake City 
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Lines should pay to Salt Lake City a tax of 2<f0 upon the gross 
revenue of the company obtained within Salt Lake City. Section 
10 of the Ordinance provided as follows: 
"Salt Lake City Lines shall, within 30 days after the 
effective date of this Ordinance, file its acceptance 
thereof in writing with the City Recorder of Salt Lake 
City, otherwise the same shall be null and void." 
Salt Lake City Lines has never at any time filed an accept-
ance of this Ordinance. Salt Lake City Lines, although it had 
never accepted the Ordinance, did pay 2<fo of its gross revenue 
derived within Salt Lake City Limits during the years 1951, 
1952, 1953, 1954, and 1955. In 1956, Salt Lake City Lines 
requested of the City Commission of Salt Lake City that it not 
be required to pay the franchise tax. The City Commission 
fhereupon adopted an Ordinance reducing the franchise tax 
to 1lfo for the year 1956. During the year 1956, Salt Lake 
City Lines paid 1 <fo of its gross revenue derived within Salt 
Lake City to the Salt Lake City government. As of January 1, 
1957, the City demanded that Salt Lake City Lines again 
resume payment of the tax at 2%. 
The gross receipts tax thus established is not applicable 
to sight-seeing busses, taxi cabs, intercity busses or any other 
type of business enterprise running rubber tired motor vehicles 
for hire on the streets of Salt Lake City. By separate Ordinances 
the 2lf0 gross receipts tax is applied to the electric utility, the 
telephone utility and the natural gas utility rendering service 
within Salt Lake City. 
Early in the year 1957 the plaintiff instituted this action 
for a declaratory judgment, declaring the Ordinance of 
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February ·27, 1951 null and void. Salt Lake City filed an 
Answer admitting the facts set forth in the Complaint and 
alleging certain additional facts. The plaintiff thereupon filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment and the defendant filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal in its favor. 
After hearing oral arguments the defendant's Motion was 
granted. No Memorandum Decision was prepared by the 
district court so it is impossible for counsel to determine the 
exact grounds upon which the order of the court was made. 
In seeking a reversal of the judgment of the court below, the 
plaintiff and appellant relies upon the following Statement 
of Points. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The District Court erred in granting the defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and denying the plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment for the following reasons: 
POINT ONE 
THE ORDINANCE OF FEBRUARY 27, 1951 IS NULL 
AND VOID UNDER ITS OWN TERMS BECAUSE OF 
THE REFUSAL OF THE PLAINTIFF TO ACCEPT THE 
SAME. 
POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENG-
ING THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE BY REA-
SON OF THE FACT THAT IT HAS VOLUNTARILY 
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MADE PAYMENT OF THE TAXES LEVIED BY SAID 
ORDINANCE. 
POINT THREE 
SECTION 8 OF THE ORDINANCE OF FEBRUARY 
27, 1951 IS VOID AND INEFFECTIVE AND IN VIOLA-
TION OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 10-8-80, 
U.C.A., 1953 FOR THE REASON THAT THE TAX 
LEVIED THEREIN IS NOT UNIFORM IN RESPECT TO 
THE CLASS UPON WHICH IT IS IMPOSED. 
POINT FOUR 
SALT LAKE CITY HAS NO POWER TO LEVY A 
TAX UPON THE PLAINTIFF IN CONSIDERATION OF 
THE GRANTING OF A FRANCHISE FOR THE REASON 
THAT SALT LAKE CITY HAS NO POWER OR 
AUTHORITY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH TO EITHER GRANT OR WITHHOLD A FRAN-
CHISE FOR THE BUSINESS CARRIED ON AND CON-
DUCTED BY THE PLAINTIFF AT AND SINCE THE 
TIME OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE ORDINANCE OF 
FEBRUARY 27, 1951. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE ORDINANCE OF FEBRUARY 27, 1951 IS NULL 
AND VOID UNDER ITS OWN TERMS BECAUSE OF 
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THE REFUSAL OF THE PLAINTIFF TO ACCEPT THE 
SAME. 
The Ordinance of February 27, 1951 purports to grant 
~~ franchise to the plaintiff to engage in the business of render-
ing mass transportation service within Salt Lake City. The 
Ordinance authorizes the company to render service by means 
of motor coaches, trolley coaches or street cars. Paragraph 8 
of the Ordinance imposes the 2c;'o gross receipts tax as a con-
sideration for t!he granting of the Ordinance. Paragraph 10 
of the Ordinance provides that unless it is accepted in writing 
by the company within 30 days after enactment, it shall 
become null and void. It is admitted by the Answer that the 
plaintiff company did not file a written acceptance of the 
Ordinance. The reasons that the company did not file the 
written acceptance are obvious. In the first place, it did not 
want a franchise to operate street cars and trolley coaches 
because it had not been operating that type of conveyance for 
some four years and had no intention of ever again operating 
such conveyances. In t!he second place, under the laws of the 
State of Utah, Salt Lake City was without power to either 
grant or withhold a franchise to operate motor busses as will 
be hereinafter more fully discussed. In the third place, the 
company did not want to become subject to the 2c;'o gross 
receipts tax. The company not having complied with the 
requirements of the franchise ordinance to make it become 
operative, the Ordinance falls by its own terms and the lower 
court should have declared it null and void because of that fact. 
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POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENG-
ING THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE BY REA-
SON OF THE FACT THAT IT HAS VOLUNTARILY 
MADE PAYMENT OF THE TAXES LEVIED BY SAID 
ORDINANCE. 
The defendant, while it admits that the plaintiff did not 
accept the Ordinance in writing according to the terms thereof, 
maintains that the plaintiff is now estopped from attacking 
the validity of the Ordinance on two grounds: 
A. That it has actually carried on the business of render-
ing mass transportation in Salt Lake City since the enactment 
of the Ordinance; and 
B. That it has made payment of the tax provided for in 
the Ordinance for a number of years since the enactment of 
the Ordinance. 
The invalidity of the first basis of estoppel claimed will 
be more fully discussed in another section. Suffice it to say 
at this point that the plaintiff does not recognize the right of 
Salt Lake City to either grant or withhold a franchise to operate 
motor busses on the Salt Lake City streets. The power to 
either withhold or grant a franchise is vested by the laws of 
the State of Utah with the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
The acts of the plaintiff in carrying on such business since 
February 27, 1951 are not acceptance of the franchise require-
ments even by implication for the reason that the plaintiff 
was doing nothing that it could not have done and would not 
have done had the franchise Ordinance never been adopted. 
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It was carrying on its business of rendering mass transportation 
service not pursuant to the Ordinance of February 27, 1951, but 
pursuant to Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 640 
issued by the Public Service Commission of the State of Utah. 
The second ground of estoppel claimed by the defendant 
is equally without merit. The fact that the tax has been paid 
cannot raise an estoppel. It is fundamental that an estoppel 
arises only where one party by the performance of an act has 
caused another party to change its position to its detriment in 
reliance upon such act. 
The following language is found at 19 Am. Jur. page 642 
and 643: 
"The essential elements of an equitable estoppel as · 
related to the party estopped are: ( 1) Conduct which 
amounts to a false representation or concealment of 
material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to con-
vey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, 
and inconsistent with, those which the party sub-
sequently attempts to assert; ( 2) intention, or at least 
expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by 
the other party; ( 3) knowledge, actual or constructive, 
qf the real facts. As related to the party claiming the 
estoppel, they are: ( 1) Lack of knowledge and of fhe 
means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in 
question; (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party 
estopped; and ( 3) action based thereon of such a char-
acter as to change his position prejudicially.'' 
Applying the tests set forth above, let us ask the question, 
First: Has Salt Lake City suffered from the act of the plaintiff 
in paying the tax? The answer is obviously it has not, it has 
benefited. The 2<;'0 gross receipts tax yields a great deal more 
revenue than would a tax on the plaintiff company based upon 
10 
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the same rates of taxation as are applied to other companies 
operating rubber-tired motor vehicles on the city streets for 
hire. Although this is not part of the record, it was agreed 
by counsel at oral argument before the lower court that the 
gross receipts tax has yielded Salt Lake City over the period 
of years an average of $30,000.00 each year, whereas the 
vehicle tax applicable to other rubber-tired motor vehicles, as 
applied to the plaintiff's busses, would have yielded only about 
$4500.00 per year. 
The attention of the court is called to the fact that this 
is not an action to recover anything that has been paid in the 
past, but merely a petition to have the franchise declared invalid 
so that the plaintiff will have to make no payments under 
the invalid ordinance from here on. It is quite clear, therefore, 
that Salt Lake City has suffered no detriment from the act of the 
plaintiff in paying the tax, but has actually benefited to the 
extent of approximately $125,000.00. Let us ask again, has 
Salt Lake City changed its position prejudicially because of the 
voluntary payment of the tax by Salt Lake City Lines. The 
answer once again is obviously no. Whatever position Salt 
Lake City Lines took in adopting the Ordinance it adopted 
prior to the time that the tax became due. It has not changed 
its position since that time, but is adhering to the position which 
it adopted at the time of the enactment of the Ordinance. 
If in fact the Ordinance is invalid and declared so, the city's 
power to adopt a new and valid Ordinance is no less today 
than it would have been immediately after the enactment of 
the Ordinance and before the payment of any money under 
the tax was made. There are no elements of estoppel present 
11 
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in this case and there is no reason why the plaintiff should 
not be permitted to attack the validity of the Ordinance today 
with the same force and effect that it could have attacked it 
on the first day of April, 1951. 
This same point was raised before the Supreme Court of 
Iowa in the case of Edward J. McKeon et al v. Cit-y of Council 
Bluffs, 221 N.W. 351. In 1877 the Missouri River changed 
its course cutting off from the City of Council Bluffs an area 
of some 1200 acres which had formerly been contiguous to 
the balance of the city. Although the cut-off portion, from the 
time of the shift of the river on, received no benefits from the 
city in the way of police service, fire service, etc. no petition 
for severance from the city was made for a period of some 
50 years after the change in course. In the late 1920's the 
residents of the portion of the city which had been cut off, 
petitioned for severance on the ground that their property was 
no longer contiguous to the balance of the city and received no 
benefits from the city. The city attempted to defend on the 
grounds that the residents of this area were estopped from 
raising the question of severance because for a period of 
50 years following the shift in the course of the river they 
had continued to pay taxes levied by the City of Council Bluffs. 
In disposing of this question of estoppel the Iowa Supreme 
Court stated: 
"Equitable estoppel does not arise, in the absence of 
reliance and injury. If the adverse party has not acted 
to his prejudice, he is in no position to assert an equi-
table estoppel. Harley v. Merrill Brick Co. 83 Iowa, 73, 
48 N.W. 1000; 5 Porn Eq. Jur. 4th ed. Sec. 951; 21 C. J. 
1202. * * * No prejudice has resulted to the city of 
12 
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Council Bluffs from the delay in asking for severance. 
The city has during the years subjected the property in 
question to municipal taxation without reciprocal bene-
fits. Submission to an inequitable tax for one year can 
give no right to the imposition of it the next year. Such 
payment of taxes cannot be effectively set up as estop-
pel. Deiman v. Ft. Madison, 30 Iowa, 542, 5 50. 
"Furthermore, the property owners have had each 
and every year the statutory right to severance. The 
condition giving them that right was a continuing con-
dition, and the statutory right was a continuing right. 
None of the suggested defenses can apply to such a 
continuing and ever-existing and present right. Deiman 
v. Ft. Madison, 30 Iowa, 542; Smith v. Jefferson, 161 
Iowa, 245, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 792, 142 N. W. 220, 
Ann. Cas. 1916A, 97; MacGowan v. Gibbon, 94 Neb. 
772, 144 N.W. 808." 
The defendant has suffered no detriment from the fact 
that the plaintiff has voluntarily paid the tax. The company 
should not, therefore, be estopped now that it is in financial 
straits and has difficulty paying the tax by the fact that during 
more affluent years it voluntarily paid the tax illegally imposed 
in order to avoid an open breach with the city authorities. 
POINT THREE 
SECTION 8 OF THE ORDINANCE OF FEBRUARY 
27, 1951 IS VOID AND INEFFECTIVE AND IN VIOLA-
TION OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 10-8-80, 
U.C.A., 1953 FOR THE REASON THAT THE TAX 
LEVIED THEREIN IS NOT UNIFORM IN RESPECT TO 
THE CLASS UPON WHICH IT IS IMPOSED. 
13 
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Section 10-8-80, U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows: 
"License fees and taxes.-They may raise revenue 
by levying and collecting a license fee or tax on any 
business within the limits of the city, and regulate the 
same by ordinance; provided, that no Utah city or town 
shall collect a license fee or tax hereunder from any 
solicitor or salesman who solicits, obtains orders for or 
sells goods in such city or town solely for resale; and 
no enumeration of powers of cities contained in this 
chapter, shall be deemed to limit or restrict the general 
grant of authority hereby conferred. All such license 
fees and taxes shall be uniform in respect to the class 
upon which they are imposed. (Italics added.) 
Salt Lake City has made no effort to make the gross 
receipts tax applicable to other firms or individuals carrying 
on businesses of the same class as that carried on by Salt Lake 
City Lines. The tax is not applicable to sigth-seeing busses 
which operate mostly within Salt Lake City, it is not applicable 
to taxi cabs, nor is it applicable to inter-city buslines which 
operate in and through Salt Lake City. These other companies 
pay a per vehicle tax which is graded upward according to the 
passenger carrying capacity of the ve'hicle in question. This 
vehicle tax if applied to Salt Lake City Lines would be but a 
small fraction of the amount of the gross receipts tax. The only 
other firms to which the gross receipts tax is applicable are the 
gas, electric and telephone utilities and certainly Salt Lake 
City Lines cannot be classified with these other utilities because, 
as is more fully set forth in the next succeeding section, while 
the city does have power to franchise the operation of the gas, 
electric and telephone utilities in Salt Lake City, it has no such 
power in regard to the business carried on and conducted by 
Salt Lake City Lines. 
14 
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The necessity that a city license, fee or tax be uniform in 
respect to the class upon which it is imposed has been passed 
upon by this court a number of times. In the case of Salt 
Lake City v. Utah Light & Railway Co., 45 Ut. 50, 142 Pac. 
1067, the validity of a Salt Lake City Ordinance establishing 
a license tax was challenged. The Ordinance in question im-
posed a license tax of $1.00 per year per meter on electric 
companies furnishing electricity through metered service with-
in the limits of Salt Lake City. The court held this Ordinance 
invalid because it applied only to companies furnishing electric 
service through meters and not to all companies furnishing 
electrical service. In passing upon the validity of this Ordi-
nance, the court stated: 
"Uniformity and equality, so far as those elements 
can be attained, are always to be the aim and guide 
of those upon whom is conferred the authority to im-
pose or assess taxes. When once inequality is permitted, 
and it is established that the burden of taxation may 
be unequally distributed under governmental authority, 
the government permitting it becomes a farce and is 
entirely unworthy of either our respect or support. So 
long as the burdens of taxation are distributed equally, 
they cannot well become oppressive, since they are 
imposed upon those constituting the community at large, 
and the community as a whole always possesses the 
power to relieve itself in one way or another. When, 
however, the burdens are imposed upon only a part less 
than the majority, or a smaller fraction, the burden may 
easily become destructive, and, if not destructive, at 
least unjustly oppressive. Equality, therefore, becomes a 
safeguard against, if not an absolute prevention of, 
excessive and oppressive taxation. Where, however, 
those who, for the time being, are intrusted with the 
power to pass laws or ordinances by which taxation 
15 
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may be imposed invade the rule of equality prescribed 
by the paramount law, it is the duty of the courts, when 
proper application is made, to declare such law or 
ordinance void, and thus arrest the evil at its inception. 
In doing so the courts are not, as it is sometimes popu-
larly assumed, interfering with the law-making power, 
but are merely compelling that power to observe and 
obey the paramount law. For the reasons last stated, 
we are required to declare the ordinance in question 
invalid.'' 
In the case of Park City v. Daniels, 36 Ut. 554; 149 
Pac. 1094, the validity of a tax ordinance was challenged. The 
ordinance in question imposed a license fee on peddling or 
selling certain designated articles. In declaring the Ordinance 
unconstitutional, the court stated: 
"It will be observed that subdivision 'a', under which 
appellant was convicted, includes all who sell, offer for 
sale, or take orders for "fresh meat, or any goods, 
wares or merchandise of a general character, or for 
teas, coffees, spices, extracts, clothing, dresses, knit 
goods or underwear, either with a team or on foot." 
These are taxes at the rate of one hundred dollars a 
year payable in advance. It will also be noticed that 
each and every one of the foregoing articles are not 
only perfectly harmless, but are such as are used in all 
households, and therefore cannot require special police 
protection or regulation. The same may be said with 
regard to the articles mentioned in subdivisions 'b' and 
'c', with the exception, perhaps, that the articles men-
tioned in those two subdivisions, or at least some of 
them, are not in such constant demand or use as are 
those in subdivision 'a'. There is, however, no apparent 
reason why a person should be required to pay one 
hundred dollars a year in advance for the right to sell 
or solicit orders for "fresh meat," while he may sell 
16 
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all kinds of fish, poultry, and farm and dairy products 
for seven dollars and fifty cents a quarter payable 
quarterly. Again, why should one person be required 
to pay one hundred dollars a year in advance for selling 
tea and coffee, while he may sell any one or all of the 
other things enumerated in subdivision 'b' by paying 
seven dollars and fifty cents four times a year? Is it not 
manifest that all those who may sell, offer for sale or 
solicit orders, etc., whether for the articles enumerated 
in subdivision 'a' or any of them or those mentioned 
in the other subdivisions, are all engaged in the same 
occupation or calling, namely, selling or soliciting orders 
for the sale of articles of ordinary merchandise? Is it 
not equally manfest that a person may, with his team 
and wagon, sell and deliver quite as much in any given 
time of the articles enumerated in subdivision 'b' as he 
can of those mentioned in subdivision 'a'? Whether 
that be so or not, however, are they not all engaged 
in peddling or in attempting to sell, or in selling or 
in taking orders for the sale of ordinary articles of 
merchandise or household goods ? Again, is it not 
patent to all that there is a clear discrimination against 
those who may solicit or sell any of the articles men-
tioned in subdivision 'a' and in favor of t'hose who 
may solicit orders for or sell any of the articles 
enumerated in the other two subdivisions of the ordi-
nance in question ? 
* * * 
While the city authorities of the cities of this state 
may impose license or occupation taxes, and for that 
purpose may make reasonable classifications, yet the 
statute conferring the power (Comp. Laws 1907, sec-
tion 206, subd. 87) in express terms also provides the 
manner of the imposition of such taxes in the following 
words: 
'All such license fees and taxes shall be uniform in 
respect to the class upon whic'h they are imposed.' 
17 
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The very statute, therefore., which grants the power, 
also imposes the condition of uniformity. In Salt Lake 
City v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah, 38, 95 Pac. 523, 
17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 398, we held that it is proper to 
classify stocks of merchandise or occupations for the 
purpose of arriving at uniformity. In State v. Bayer, 34 
Utah, page 266, 97 Pac. 129, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 297, 
in referring to statutes imposing such taxes, Mr. Justice 
Straup said: 
'It is essential, however, to the constitutionality of 
such statutes, that the tax apply equally to all persons 
of a given class and is uniform and equal.' 
We enforced that rule in Salt Lake City v. Utah L. 
& Ry. Co., 45 Utah 50, 142 Pac. 1067, where we held 
a certain ordinance invalid because it was discrimina-
tory. The rule adopted by this court is the rule that 
is generally enforced by the courts of last resort. In 
2 McQuillan, Mun. Corps., section 738, the author 
states the law upon this subject thus: 
'The discriminations which are open to objection 
(lack of uniformity) are those where persons en-
gaged in the same business are subject to different 
restrictions, or are held entitled to different privi-
leges under the same conditions.'" 
It would be difficult to find an Ordinance which more 
clearly violates the requirement of uniformity than does the 
Ordinance now being challenged in this action. The Ordinance 
is applicable to one company and one company only. Further-
more, even if read in conjunction with other licensing and 
taxing ordinances it does not achieve uniformity for the reason 
that the basis of the license or tax imposed under this ordinance 
is different from those imposed in other ordinances on other 
individuals and firms engaged in the business of rendering 
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transportation to passengers for hire over and through the 
streets of Salt Lake City. Applying the test set forth in the case 
last cited, all such companies are selling the same thing, trans-
portation. The ordinance is clearly invalid and should be 
declared so by this court. 
POINT FOUR 
SALT LAKE CITY HAS NO POWER TO LEVY A 
TAX UPON THE PLAINTIFF IN CONSIDERATION OF 
THE GRANTING OF A FRANCHISE FOR THE REASON 
THAT SALT LAKE CITY HAS NO POWER OR 
AUTHORITY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH TO EITHER GRANT OR WITHHOLD A FRAN-
CHISE FOR THE BUSINESS CARRIED ON AND CON-
DUCTED BY THE PLAINTIFF AT AND SINCE THE 
TIME OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE ORDINANCE 
OF FEBRUARY 27, 1951. 
Salt Lake City apparently relies on an asserted power 
to grant a franchise to Salt Lake City Lines as a basis for the 
imposition of the gross receipts tax. In argument in the court 
below, counsel for Salt Lake City asserted this power to grant 
a franchise as a basis for the imposition of the tax on two 
separate grounds. First, it was asserted that as the city had 
the power to grant or withhold franchises, it could attach such 
terms and conditions to the granting or withholding as it saw 
fit, including the imposition of the tax. Second, it was asserted 
that as the 2lf0 gross receipts tax was, by separate ordinances, 
imposed upon the gas, electric and telephone utilities which 
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were subject to the franchise requirements of the city, the tax 
was uniform on all individuals of a given class, that class 
being the individuals or firms subject to the power of the city 
to franchise. 
Both of these asserted grounds fall, of course, if in fact 
Salt Lake City has no power to grant or withhold a franchise 
to an individual or firm which carries on a business of trans-
porting passengers by motor bus in mass transportation within 
the city. This question is not open to any doubt within the 
State of Utah, but has been passed upon by this court. In the 
case of Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Public Service Comm., 
118 P (2) 683; 101 Utah 99, decided in 1941, the 
court passed squarely upon fhis proposition. In that case, 
Utah Light & Traction Co., the predecessor company of Salt 
Lake City Lines, was operating as a transporter of persons in 
mass transportation within Salt Lake City and between Salt 
Lake City and certain adjacent areas. Utah Light & Traction 
Co. had a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity from the 
Public Service Commission of Utah. It also had a franchise 
from Salt Lake City which at that time it needed because of the 
fact that it was rendering transportation service not only by 
use of motor coach, but also by use of street cars and trolley 
coaches. The Public Service Commission of Utah had also 
granted a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to Airway 
Motor Coach Lines, Inc. to operate as a common carrier of 
passengers between certain communities in the southeast section 
of Salt Lake City and downtown Salt Lake City. Airways had 
no franchise from the city to conduct that portion of its opera-
tion which was conducted within Salt Lake City. Airways used 
no street cars nor trolley coaches, but operated entirely by 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
use of motor busses just as does Salt Lake City Lines at the 
present time. The Supreme Court held that while cities had 
the power to grant or withhold franchise to street railways, 
to waterworks companies, gas companies, electric light com-
panies, telephone and telegraph companies, etc. that they have 
no power to grant to or withhold franchise from motor bus 
companies. 
The following quoted paragraph states in full the basis 
of that opinion by this Court: 
"It is evident that the provisions of the subsection 
do not apply to certificates such as that here involved, 
but only to the classes specified in the subdivision itself. 
This is further evident from the fact that a city or 
municipal corporation has no power under our statutes 
to grant to or require an automobile corporation 
(defined in sub-division 12, Section 76-2-1, R.S.U. 
1933), to have a local franchise to engage in business 
Cities and incorporated towns have no general grant of 
power to require or grant franchises. They may grant 
franchises to railroads, street railways, tramways, and 
union railroad depot companies (Section 15-8-33), to 
waterworks companies, gas companies, electric light 
and telephone lines (Section 15-8-14); to telegraph and 
all wire lines and pole lines (Section 15-8-21) ; to gas, 
electric or lighting works (Section 15-8-20). And there 
is a special provision as to railroads in Section 77-0-8 
The Constitution, Article 12, Section 8, reserves to 
cities and incorporated towns the franchise power of 
street railway, telegraph, telephone and electric light 
companies. These sections cover all the franchise 
powers of cities and towns as set forth and granted 
by the statutes. That an automobile corporation such 
as this is not a street railway was held in Utah Rapid 
Transit Co. v. Ogden City et al., 89 Utah 546, 58 P2d. 
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See, also, subdivisions 8 and 12 of Section 76-2-1 
R.S.U. 1933, defining both terms. As to motor transpor; 
companies (automobile corporations), the cities' power 
is found in Section 15-8-39, R.S.U. 1933, providing 
"they may license, tax and regulate * * * stages and 
busses, sight-seeing and touring cars or vehicles, cabs 
and taxi-cabs * * * liackmen, draymen, and drivers 
of stages, busses, sight-seeing and touring cars, cabs and 
taxicabs and other public conveyances. (Italics added.) 
There is no power granted to require or grant a fran-
chise for the use of the streets and 'highways for the 
purpose of traveling thereon as used by the public 
generally. A franchise is the privilege of doing that 
which does not belong to the citizens generally by a 
common right. 12 R.C.L. p. 174. As to streets, it is 
the right to do something in the public highway which 
except for the grant would be a trespass. People v. 
State Board of Tax Com'rs, 174 N.Y. 417, 67 N.E. 69, 
63 L.R.A. 884, 105 Am. St. Rep. 674; 12 R.C.L. p. 175. 
Thus the right to lay rail, or pipes, or string wires or 
set poles along a public street is not an ordinary business 
in which everyone may engage, or a use everyone may 
make of the street, but is a special privilege, a franchise 
to be granted for the accomplishment of public objects. 
They are required only in cases in which it is sought 
to impose upon the street a special burden which can-
not be imposed generally, that is, to burden the street 
with a special privilege which the public generally may 
not likewise enjoy. Business such as that of the Air-
ways does not so burden the street_ It uses the streets 
only for purposes of travel and transport in the same 
manner as the public generally. It is a business not 
subject to franchise requirements." 
The operations of Salt Lake City Lines at the present time 
is in all respects similar to the operation carried on and con-
ducted by Airways in 1941. In fact it is a matter of common 
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knowledge, of which t'his court can take judicial notice, that 
Salt Lake City Lines acquired the operating rights and proper-
ties of Airways in addition to those of Utah Light & Traction 
Co. and now operates over the same routes as were operated 
by Airways at the time of the above entitled case. Furthermore, 
as has been pointed out above, on the routes formerly operated 
by Utah Light & Traction Company, Salt Lake City Lines has 
removed all rails, overhead trolleys and other equipment which 
burden the streets, and operates solely by means of motor busses. 
To use the language of this court in the case above cited: "It 
uses the streets only for purposes of travel and transport 
in the same manner as the public generally." 
Certainly if Salt Lake City had no power to grant a fran-
chise to Salt Lake City Lines, it would have no power to 
impose a tax in consideration of the purported granting of a 
franchise. Likewise, if the city had no power to grant a fran-
chise for this type of operation, it could not meet the require-
ments of Sec. 10-8-80, U.C.A. 1953 as to uniformity by attempt-
ing to group Salt Lake City Lines into classification with other 
companies which the city did have the power to franchise. Salt 
Lake City Lines cannot be classified with the electric, gas or 
telephone utilities. It must be classified with other transport 
companies which use the streets in hauling passengers for 
hire, and must be taxed on the same basis as such other 
companies. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the position of appellant that the Ordinance of 
February 27, 1951 should be declared null and void. First, 
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because it never at any time became operative under its own 
terms because of the refusal of the plaintiff to accept the 
ordinance. Second, the gross receipts tax portion of the ordi-
nance is invalid as it levies a tax which is not uniform in respect 
to the class upon which it is imposed. The case should be 
remanded to the District Court with directions to vacate the 
order of dismissal and to grant the plaintiff's motion for a 
summary judgment declaring invalid the Ordinance of February 
27, 1951. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
721 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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